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HIGHLIGHTS   
• The R&D sector is an important enabler of innovation to support growth. 
• The attention-grabbing hypothesis provides a behavioural explanation for abnormal 
returns for FDA approval announcements for NYSE listed firms. 
• We support event-day misspecification as an alternative explanation. 
• Increases in shareholder wealth are driven by after-market-close announcements.  
 
ARTICLE INFO  ABSTRACT 
Article history:   
The attention-grabbing hypothesis has been offered as 
a behavioural explanation for post-event abnormal 
returns for FDA drug approval announcements for 
NYSE listed firms. We show that when event-day 
mis-specification is accounted for the market reaction 
is centred on the event-day and that the increase in 
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The importance of R&D in driving innovation is well established in the endogenous growth 
literature (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Dungey and Volkov, 2018). Subsidies and patents are 
two of the main tools of R&D policy to support and protect the outputs from innovation 
(Perez-Sebastian, 2015). In this paper we focus our analysis on shareholder wealth effects 
for pharmaceuticals firms listed on the New York (NYSE) who were granted Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval for new drug applications. Specifically, this paper 
investigates the impact of determining the exact timing of the market’s reaction to FDA 
approval announcements and explores whether the attention-grabbing hypothesis provides 
an explanation for post-event abnormal returns reported (Hamill et al., 2013). Berkman and 
Truong (2009) show that post-event abnormal returns accompanying earnings 
announcements can be explained by mis-specification of the event day 0.  
 
Barber and Odean (2008) examine the day following extreme returns to mitigate 
endogeneity. In an event study context, strict application of their model implies possible 
post-event abnormal returns on day +1. They point out that news items, such as FDA 
approvals, will catch the attention of some investors, while the extreme one-day returns — 
the previous day’s big gainers and losers — will catch the attention of others.  The result 
is that many investors may learn of the extreme returns/news after the market closes such 
that their first opportunity to respond is the next trading day. Ex-ante, adjusting for event 
day misspecification and observing a positive market reaction on day +1 supports the 
attention-grabbing hypothesis and should provide impetus to explore this issue further. In 
contrast, accounting for after-market-close announcements and observing a market 
reaction exclusively on day 0 provides clear evidence of the impact of event day 
misspecification and the need to make this adjustment when seeking to understand 




We identify original new drug approvals — including New Drug Applications (NDAs) — 
and biologic license applications (BLAs) from January 2009 to December 2015 from the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) website. We note that drug approvals for sale in 
the US can be traded to another pharmaceutical company. Because the FDA monthly drug 
database only shows current information for the products listed (i.e. at December 2016)1 
we also match the drug approvals database with the applicant column in the “CDER Drug 
and Biologic Calendar Year Approvals” list provided every year to align the actual sponsor 
companies with the FDA drug announcements. In our sample all companies are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. To be included in the sample firms must have daily share 
price data available to conduct an event study from DataStream. We exclude any 
observations with contemporaneous news announcements +/- 3 days from the LexisNexis 







1 Note from FDA website, consulted December 2016. 
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Table 1 











2009 0 2 21 12 35 
2010 0 2 16 11 29 
2011 1 7 15 10 33 
2012 2 5 13 8 28 
2013 2 4 15 9 30 
2014 1 8 19 8 36 
2015 0 13 22 7 42 
Total 6 41 121 65 233 
Notes: Before the market open for announcements released before 9:30 ET of the FDA announcement dates; 
during market hours for those announced from 9:30 to 16:00 ET; after the market close for FDA notifications 
occurred after 16:00 ET of the announcement dates or a couple of days after the FDA announcement dates. 
   
We use PRNewswire and Business Wire to identify the announcement dates and 
timestamps from press releases issued by the firm being granted a new drug approval. The 
FDA’s ‘Policy and Procedures for Communicating Approval Information’, the information 
dissemination process from the FDA to the firm, requires the regulatory project manager 
to promptly inform the application company of the FDA’s decision before notifying the 
FDA Press Officer2. Therefore, there is a possibility that a firm’s own announcement may 
precede an announcement on the FDA website and other online sources. To ensure the 
timing of a drug approval announcement is exact we also searched for press releases on the 
company’s website. When timings from alternative sources conflicted, the earliest 
timestamp was used.  We identified the precise timings for 168 approval announcements 




An event study methodology is employed to estimate abnormal returns to FDA approval 
announcements for a 43-day test period from day -21 to +21 with the market model 
estimated from day -150 to -22 with the S&P 500 market index used as the market proxy. 
Scholes and Williams’ (1977) procedure is adopted to adjust the beta to account for the 
possibility of asynchronous prices when calculating returns. We use Ruback's (1982) test 
to calculate the significance of cumulative abnormal returns over different holding periods. 
To ameliorate their influences, and to corroborate the results for the parametric event study, 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test is also employed as a robustness check.   
 
4.  Results 
Table 2 panel A columns 1 and 2 report the results for the unadjusted sample which simply 
takes the approval date announced by the FDA and ignores the time of the announcement 
— which could be before-market-close (BMC), or after-market-close (AMC). As would 
be expected, given insider trading restrictions, and consistent with the empirical literature, 
the pre-event mean abnormal returns on day -1 and CARs over the holding periods (-10:-
1) and (-5:-1) are statistically insignificant. The market reaction on day 0 is also 
 
2 See FDA’s Policy and Procedures about Communicating Approval Information, consulted April 2017. 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM082010.pdf 
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insignificant whereas the mean abnormal return of 0.44 of a percent on day 1 is significant 
with a t-statistic of 4.61. Ostensibly, this would support the attention-grabbing hypothesis. 
The economic importance of this economically and statistically significant day 1 mean 
abnormal return is evident from the post-event abnormal returns, i.e. the CAR holding 
periods (1:2) and (1:21) are also statistically significant but that for period (2:21) is 
insignificant.   
Table 2  
Shareholder wealth effects around FDA new drug approval announcements 
 Unadjusted Event adjusted Event and time stamp 
adjusted 
AR/MRa 
N = 233 
t-stat  AR/MRa 
N = 233 
t-stat  AR/MRa 
N = 168 
t-stat  
Panel A: Parametric tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
[-10, -1] 0.18 0.62  0.15 0.48  0.14 0.34  
[-5, -1] 0.17 0.81       -0.08 -0.36  -0.19 -0.69  
-1 -0.08 -0.89  0.06 0.57  0.05 0.40  
0 -0.03 -0.36  0.42** 4.22  0.61** 4.90  
1 0.44** 4.61  0.11 1.07  0.04 0.28  
2 0.07 0.69  -0.06 -0.58  -0.09 -0.77  
[1, 2] 0.50** 3.83  0.05 0.34  -0.06 -0.35  
[1, 21] 0.97** 2.32  0.53 1.18  0.39 0.68  
[2, 21] 0.53 1.30  0.43 0.97  0.35 0.63  
Panel B: Corrado’s Non-Parametric tests 
-1 -2.33 -0.68  2.42 0.73  2.03 0.49  
0      -2.22 -0.64  2.13 0.64  4.54 1.11  
1 6.58* 1.91  5.18 1.56  4.13 1.01  
Notes: aAR is mean abnormal returns from the parametric events study, while MR is the mean rank from 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. *denotes significant at the 5% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, or less. N is the sample size. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results when the sample is event-adjusted to identify day 0 as 
the day investors are able to trade on the information. Table 1 highlights that, for the total 
sample of 233 announcements, 121 took place AMC. The adjusted sample treats these 
AMC announcements as if they occurred on event day 0 given that the stock price cannot 
reflect this information until the following day. When the dataset is thusly re-centred, day 
0 has a positive market reaction of 0.42 of a per cent with a t-statistic of 4.22 and day +1 
becomes insignificant. Columns 5 and 6 report the results from this re-centred excluding 
the 65 announcements where a timestamp could not be identified. The market reaction on 
day 0 remains statistically significant with a mean abnormal return of 0.61 of a percent and 
accompanying t-statistic of 4.90.  
 
From a firm valuation perspective these results support the hypothesis that FDA approval 
announcements are value relevant and convey new information to the market. From a 
theoretical perspective, the value of firms in the pharmaceutical sector can be viewed as a 
portfolio of real options (Hartman and Hassan, 2006) which recognises that R&D projects 
are a collection of bets with a low probability of paying off given the observed empirical 
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probability of success for new drug discoveries3. Pharmaceutical investors for a small 
number of blockbuster discoveries4. To evaluate the possibility that the market reaction 
reflects a few extreme observations we use Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test as a 
robustness check. The results in panel B of Table 2 show that, for the unadjusted sample, 
day +1 remains significant at the 5% level with a mean rank of 6.58.  For both the event-
adjusted sample and the event- and timestamp-adjusted sample, none of the days are 
statistically significant which indicates that the mean abnormal return of 0.61 of a percent 
reported in panel A is influenced significantly by a few large observations — an outcome 
consistent with the payoff from a portfolio of real options. 
 
Table 3 











Panel A: Parametric test 
-1 0.27 1.31  -0.03 -0.23  
0 -0.18 -0.89  0.92** 6.23  
1 -0.06 -0.32  0.07 0.50  
Panel B: Corrado’s Non-Parametric test 
-1 13.76* 1.86  -2.52 -0.51  
0 -10.03 -1.36  10.20* 2.08  
1 11.55 1.57  1.25 0.26  
Notes: aAR is mean abnormal returns from the parametric events study, while MR is the mean rank from 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. *denotes significant at the 5% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, or less. N is the sample size. The 47 BMC announcements comprise 6 before market open 
announcements and 41 during market hours. 
   
Table 3 reports the results for the parametric event study and Corrado’s nonparametric rank 
test for the BMC and AMC announcements. None of the BMC mean abnormal returns for 
days -1, 0 and +1 are statistically significant. Day -1 is significant at the 5% level for the 
rank test. The lack of consistency for the BMC sample provides strong support for an 
economically significant market reaction. In contrast, the AMC announcements are 
statistically significant for both tests with an economically significant market reaction of 
0.92 of a percent that is significant at the 1% level. There is no evidence of market reaction 
on days -1 or + 1 for the parametric or non-parametric tests for the AMC sample. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We show that when an appropriate adjustment for timing is made, the positive market 
reaction to FDA approval announcements is centred on day 0 and is driven by after-market-
close announcements.  Our results are robust to the influence of outliers. This analysis 
supports event day misspecification as opposed to the attention-grabbing hypothesis as an 
explanation for shareholder wealth effects.   
 
3 One estimate is that approximately 5 out of 5000 new chemical entities progress to human clinical trials 
with only 1 likely to be granted FDA approval (Dedman et al., 2008). 
4 The FDA approval of the muscular dystrophy drug Eteplirsen 2016 increased the share price of Sarepta 
Therapeutics by 90%. “FDA Approves Sarepta’s Muscular Dystrophy Drug”, Wall Street Journal, 19 th 
September 2016.   
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